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I. 
PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING 
The parties to this proceeding are identified in the caption. 
Appellant, Deborah Turney, was the defendant below. Respondent, 
American States Insurance Company ("American States"), an Indiana 
Corporation, was the plaintiff. Although not named as a party 
defendant by American States, John Turney, defendant's husband, is 
an owner of the insurance policy which is the subject of this 
declaratory judgment action. 
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IV. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal \c *rocr- a * . • udgment entered f^vcn of the 
plaintiff : i i ! 1 r~^ r r * 
judgment a c t i o n , under ^ / 8 - J J - WC . ^ghUi ~ a * ~ — 
D i s t r i c t Cour+ ; T in tah '• l o n o r a b l e John r Anderson 
p r e s i d i n g . u * ; i a n t i u 
§ 7 8 -2 a -3 ( j ) , U C A 
V. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether or not the coi ir t below er r e c \~ denying defen-
dant " s cross-ir 
the insurance policy in question as designat . iy Jonn iuj.,ic>, u^ u, 
indiviuaai a in • * "j named insured, thereby providing underinsured 
motorist covers ^  . . . . 
to hold, that the undisputed evidence established that Joseph Priot-
was * -ember11 ~f T^Hr n^^n^\ within the meaning of that 
terra u:;a-~r .. .
 A .1 n f ii pser"^! 1 I n "in u 
at F< . -145-0 IB! ; 
2 Whethrr or not fh^ court below - ^ T P H in entering judgment 
for Amer * - -•- , -
question unambiguously insured only a partnership .-.^d 
Turn*' ; ais an individual, thereby excluding underinsured motorist 
viii 
coverage for John Turney's family members (preserved for review at 
R. 0169-0181)? 
Because this appeal is from the grant of plaintiff's motion 
for summary judgment and the denial of defendant's cross motion, 
all issues are reviewed as a matter of law for correctness. Winecrar 
v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). 
VI. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULE3 AND REGULATIONS 
This appeal involves no determinative constitutional pro-
vision, statute, ordinance, rule or regulation• 
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VII. 
STATEMENT OF THE CA8E 
Nature and Course of Proceedings Below. 
Plaintiff American States fiipd t u !-•_-:•« 
action seeking ruling, that Joseph Price was not covered by the 
i inderi i ISI ; n € i IT - - . isurance policy issued 1: .• : > 
his stepfather rurney , a< L_ . 
against Price's mother, defendant Deborah T u r n e r a:~e:' sn* 
; i ; / for Price's deat^: r ?. vehicular 
accident. After some discovery was conducted, 
for summary judgment, the primary issue being the construction of 
c-r* ui45-4-'-'.. Those provisions 
p r o v m e underinsured motorist coverage for the "family members 1 
the named insured (R. 0094), 
P *- .ed Aprix ±u "f- asserted 
that the only named insured under the policy was bp;.;. •..,::-. 
Construction, a partnership consisting of Vent Slaugh and J'ohr. 
Ti lr i ie: (I I C 1 IGi) | ] „ i,j
 [: „ | J f f „ „< iSer tie 5 4 1 " >* '! • : • ^ • a partnership 
has no family members, Price was ilot coverec ;„> i,ne underinsured 
motorist provisions, Plaintiff argued, -he alternative, that 
eve11 i 1 ooveraoi" ri ,i 11 ^ vt PHI-I I T H * ni.i^  • • . ismbsz's " pjrj^^ did 
not meet the policy criteria because ri£ cL<? .-_:_ reside full-time 
with his mother and stepfather. Plaintiff's only evidence of 
P — :J • j ohn Turney 
had said that Price lived "wherever" .-. 0183). 
1 
Defendant's cross-motion and opposing memorandum were filed on 
May 9, 1996 (R. 0145). She asserted that Turney, as an individual, 
was a named insured under the policy, which designates "Vent Slaugh 
and John Turney d/b/a Split Mountain Construction" as the "Named 
Insured" (R. 0070). Thus, the policy's underinsured motorist 
provisions, which cover the "family members" of named insureds, 
would include Price, Turney's stepson. Deborah Turney submitted an 
affidavit stating that Price met the definition of "family member" 
because he resided at her (and John Turney's) home (R. 0185).1 
Oral argument was heard on September 18, 1996, before the 
Honorable John R. Anderson. The court below adopted plaintiff's 
construction, and held that the policy unambiguously insured only 
a partnership, and not the individuals. Thus, the court found it 
unnecessary to decide whether or not Price met the definition of 
"family member." The court rested its ruling upon the premise that 
a partnership is recognized as a legal entity, which is separate 
from the partners comprising it (9/18/96 Tr., pp. 14-16). 
The court entered its order granting final judgment in favor 
of plaintiff on October 3, 1996 (R. 0203-5). Defendant's timely 
notice of appeal was filed on November 1, 1996 (R. 0206) . By order 
dated November 26, 1996, the appeal was transferred to the Utah 
Plaintiff's reply brief, which was filed on May 22, 1996, 
asserts that this affidavit was unsigned. A signed copy of the 
affidavit was served on plaintiff on May 24, 1996, about four 
months before the hearing on the motions was held in September of 
1996 (R. 0185). 
2 
Supreme Court (R. 02 0 8 ) . on January ^ i • ^ r i- * 
this Court (P. 02 28). 
B. Facts Relevant to Appeal. 
Defendant ' s decedent, J oseph price, was fatally !i-^:?^'i :- *• 
automobile accident 01 i or about December 1 7. 1 
the time of the accident, Price was a passenger in ,\ vehicle owned 
and opera*-'1 1 by -"'a burr. iu. Neither Gurr nor ' • vehicle have 
any connection with Price' s stepfather, 3 ohi Ti ii • i -
ness, Id, Price was not an employee of Turney*s business. Id. 
Affpi ".pttli- - WILII b u n foe t policy limit of $25,000, 
Deborah Turney made a claim with American States under ti le in iciex-
insured motorist provisions of the policy '- question, which was 
i •" -*.*•• . •• 4 om American States. Deborah and 
John Turney were married when Price was seven years old. 
He was twenty at the time of his death. 
T .*» : r about June :.xf>, 2 9° ±.L 
lists the "Named Insured" , ' o laugh and John Turney .; ,.-/a 
Split Mountain Construction" (R. 0070) r -.> L ime it was issued, 
t < covered vehicle, Kenworth 
tractor. Between June and December 1994 five aaao„ ;ies 
were added » I I nf tl leni street vehicles.' ! rih« commercial 
defendant's counsel noted, at oral argument, that one of these 
vehicles was co-owned by Joseph Price, although it does not appear 
that any evidence was submitted on this point. 
3 
liability coverage designation lists "partnership" as the form of 
business (R. 0071) . 
The underinsured motorist provision of the policy designates 
"insureds" as: 
1. You. 
2. If you are an individual, any "family 
member." 
3. Anyone else "occupying" a covered "auto" 
or a temporary substitute for a covered 
"auto." The covered "auto" must be out of 
service because of its breakdown, repair, 
servicing, "loss or destruction. 
4. Anyone for damages he or she is entitled 
to recover because of "bodily injury" sus-
tained by another "insured." 
(R. 0094). 
The policy provides: 
Throughout this policy the words "you" and 
"your" refer to the Named Insured shown in the 
Declarations, and to any other person or 
organization qualifying as a Named Insured 
under this policy. 
R. 0075). 
Thus, the "family members" of a named insured are covered by 
the underinsured motorist protection. The underinsured motorist 
provision defines "family member" as "a person related to you by 
blood, marriage or adoption which is a resident of your household 
including a ward or foster child" (R. 0095). 
Defendant maintains that John Turney, as an individual, was a 
named insured, and that Price was, therefore, covered by the 
underinsured motorist provisions as a family member of John Turney. 
4 
VIII. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
CM !
 : .,., .. • • , .. ..-• : • 
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR 8UMMARY JUDGMENT 
1. The Policy Must be Interpreted as Including John Turney as a 
Named Insured. 
The policy in question provides under insured motorist coverage 
t D I he " 1 .nil i I y members" of the named insureds.. Because John 
Turney, the individual, is listed by name in tl ie desi gi lati : >i 1, 1 le i = -
a named insured ar<; ::. - family members are covered by the under 
i 
Construing the policy from the perspective nl -i i t'dscuidlili 
insured, listing Turney's name in the Named Insured designation u> 
a e (pit iiidir.i1 n t I,at he xs a named insured. See, United States 
Fidelity & Guaranty v. Sandt, 8>4 I-. . d ->19, 523-2 c 
Christiansen v. Holiday Rent-A-Car, 845 P. 2d 1316, 13 18 (Utah App. 
199 2) (i d € i n t :i !:;  • : • f: p a i: t i e s J! I s t e d i i i designation is the b e s t 
indication named insured) Adding the phrase "dy 1: -, a 
Slpit Mountain Constructior : . - s • - • individuals 1 names does not 
remcv" UI/MTI n^ n im*jH i nsu , . .because nd/b/a" is merely descriptive 
of the parties originally identified. See, Carlson v. Doekson 
Gross, Inc. , 373 N.W 2d v- , • * • N.. :*c (under policy using 
"11 11 «i "i 1 c"w i gri.r . namea insured) . 
Even if defendant :• interpretation i s not clear, plaint it 1 y L. 
view that only Split Mountain was a named insured is not clear 
5 
either. This ambiguity, which results from alternative plausible 
constructions, must be resolved against the plaintiff, the insurer, 
and in favor of coverage. See Sandt, 845 P.2d at 523-25. 
2. The Court Erred in Adopting Plaintiff's Construction. 
Acknowledging that a partnership is a separate entity for some 
purposes does not preclude designating individual partners as named 
insureds. See Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Huddleston, 
514 S.W.2d 676, 678 (Ky. App. 1974); Weber v. Snvderville West. 800 
P.2d 316, 318 (Utah App. 1990). The issue remains one of constru-
ing the language of the documents involved in the transaction. See 
Weber, 800 P.2d at 318. Here, that language refers to John Turney 
as well as to Split Mountain. 
Moreover, the policy in question does not limit or exclude who 
is a named insured based upon form of business. Underinsured 
motorist coverage depends, expressly, upon who is a named insured 
without regard to form of business. Thus, it was error to rely 
upon form of business (i.e., partnership) to limit this coverage. 
Indeed, had that been intended, plaintiff could have easily stated 
as much in clearer terms. 
The cases relied upon by plaintiff were not on point. All 
plaintiff's cases acknowledge the significance of listing partners 
by name instead of just the partnership. See Burnsed v. Florida 
Farm Bur. Cas. Ins., 549 So.2d 793 (Fla. App. 1989). 
6 
It was clear error tc ; -V \;r -:\ ^hf insurer's subjective 
expectations as
 a ground :*v imiting coverage. See Allen v. 
Prudential Property and Casualty Ins. Co.t 
1992) 
3. Price was a Family Member. 
Under the policy, whether - i<_- was . !-:?VJ:V member 
depends upon hi^ residenLt- • -1 ^ 
sufficient to establish Price's residence as qualifying under tr:t-
policy Plaintiff submitted no contrary evidence. Thus, defendant 
is entitled to judgment See Thayne v. Beneficial 
Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 120, 124 (Utah 1994). 
(B) 
ALTERNATIVELY, THE JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF MUST 
BE REVERSED AND THE CASE REMANDED 
The mere filing of cross-motions for summary judgment does not 
compel -curt to grant one or See Amiacs Interwest, 
Inc. v. Design Associates, 635 1,2d 5 3 55 (Utah 1981) Ilere, 
regardless of whether <»r not defendant proved her interpretation to 
be correct, plaintiff ldile.1 
The judgment for defendant must be vacated, although the court may 
remand to consider extrinsic evidence instead of directing that a 
judgment be entered for defendai it. 
7 
IX. 
ARGUMENT 
(A) 
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED DEFENDANTS 
MOTION FOR 8UMMARY JUDGMENT 
1. The Policy Must Be Interpreted as Including John Turney, the 
Individual, as a Named Insured. 
The core issue here is very simple—is John Turney a named 
insured under the policy in question? If he is a named insured, he 
comes within the term "you" in the policy's underinsured motorist 
provisions and his "family members" are covered. In this regard 
the defendant, Ms. Turney, need only show that her husband is one 
of several named insureds, whereas plaintiff must show that the 
partnership was the only named insured. 
Defendant's construction rests upon the plain, ordinary 
meaning of the terms chosen by American States to designate the 
"Named Insured." See United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. 
Sandt, 854 P. 2d 519, 523 (Utah 1993) (policy terms should be 
accorded their plain, ordinary meaning); see also, Loya v. State 
Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 888 P.2d 447, 451 (N.M. 1994) (insurer may 
not alter the "generally understood meaning" of a "common word" by 
inserting a "unique definition" in the policy). A reasonable 
layperson would certainly interpret the designation "Vent Slaugh 
and John Turney d/b/a Split Mountain Construction" to include, as 
named insureds, Slaugh and Turney, as well as Split Mountain. See 
8 
Sandt, 854 P. 2d at 524. This is because they are identified by 
name in the designation. 
It is genei . 
named insureds is determined by who is listed name. See 
Christiansen v. Holiday Rent-A-Car, 845 P.2d 1316, 1318 (Utah App. 
1992); see also. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Roberta, 
119, 122-23 (Idaho 1996) (party listed as named insured had tiiat 
status, notwithstanding exclusions) ; Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. 
Liliestrand, 
"John Turney" under the "Named Insured" designation is a fairly 
c ndication that he is intended rr> enjc^/ that status—even 
other names are also liste ,i. ? 
Mountain Construction" to Slaugh and Turney does not obviate the 
fact that they 'it*'1 individually listed. 
Moreover, the designat i«",ir« " )i ',i . . . i ". mit'i uly descr i pi: i '. "v 
. . , [and] does not create i- entity distinct from the person 
oper at i in; j I.he business." Southern Insurance Co. v. Consumer 
Insurance Agency, Inc. , 44: y siu,f. , i MI" ' /;, ; 
(quoting Duval v. Midwest Auto Citv. Inc., 425 i-".Supp. 1381, 138 7 
(Do Neo. L? . JLL is axiomatic that using "d'b/a" designation 
does not re., V P the named i : idi \ i d/: i- >^i -..- -; .  :-*.-•.., ; 
Id. • *- nas a is- been held, that the use of such a designation 
a bus nsurance policy refers to tne individual and f • * 
separate entity. See Carlson v. Doekson Gross, Inc., 
902, 905 (N.D. 1985). Accord, O'Hanlan v. Hartford Accident and 
9 
Indemnity Co. . 639 F.2d 1019 (3rd Cir. 1981). The fact that these 
cases involved sole proprietorships is irrelevant. The point is 
that the term "d/b/a" does not, by itself, create a distinct entity 
or, more fundamentally, eviscerate the effect of listing an 
individual by name. See Anderson v. Gardner, 647 P. 2d 3 (Utah 
1982) . In this regard, one might wonder how plaintiff would 
interpret this designation, if the issue was Turney1s personal 
liability for past due premiums. 
Even if the designation chosen does not clearly include 
Turney, the individual, as a named insured, it does not clearly 
exclude him either. It is, at a minimum, ambiguous because a 
reasonable insured could plausibly read it as designating Turney as 
a named uninsured. See Sandt, 854 P.2d at 524-25 (policy is 
ambiguous, if there is a plausible alternative construction, 
notwithstanding the fact that the construction might be obvious to 
professionals). Moreover, the fact that "the construction urged by 
the insurer appears to be more reasonable" does not obviate the 
ambiguity, where there is a plausible alternative interpretation. 
Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. v. McKee. 911 S.W.2d 775, 780 (Tex. App. 
1995) ; see also. Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Dennis, 645 
P.2d 672, 675 (Utah 1982) (insurer which "uses a 'slippery1 [term] 
to mark out and designate those who are insured" can blame only 
itself if coverage proves broader than anticipated). The existence 
of such an ambiguity should have compelled the court below to 
10 
accept the construction urged by m#^  Turney, the insured. See 
Sandt, 854 P.2d at 522. 
2. The Court Below Relied upon Irrelevant and Improper Consider-
ations in Adopting Plaintiff's Construction. 
Plaintiff J burden, here r> to establish that it^ policy 
- * - - ' ' - -and ofix v «-^^ - *• 
M o u n t a i n — a s t?.-- named insured. It; persuaded int, rrurt below • 
relying upon a oartnership 1 s status as a separate, ^eq.il entity ar.-
by ref ei c . 
no bearing up^r t r n s matter J l a i n t i f f wis aided o- THIS endeavor 
by r e l y i r * number of cases , the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of which 
r a t h o i n i d i fj i Mr i I I i I! in I I  l, 11 I in in n l in I I •• in (. e e d e d i n h . i i i n | I In I i i »i 
court focus upc i :i some improper (and exaggerated) p u b l i c po l i cy 
concerns, 
American ,'liiU'i:. plciied |.u i IIIHI I y i MI MIK'I upon I hi1 ".L./ilut M| I 
partnership as a recognized separate entity, which is distinct from 
its partners. xt> rgument seems •* because Split 
Mountain is an enti - . :<i :~ na - , _* - __ exis tei ice 
precludes the possibility of dealino » , tha partners as 
individuals, ^^r^ --^ * fundamental flaws ? * M - ,~ reasoning. 
Fi rs t, the pre- . * - . . a bed i i .*...-.. 
completely separate entities for any and all purposes. Second, 
there is no Logical ->" j reason why the separate existence c: I 
a partnersl • c o m p ] e I: e - s 1 i o \ 11 d s u p p 1 a i I t b h e 
11 
existence of the individuals and, thereby, preclude naming them as 
named insureds along with the partnership. 
The cases, which plaintiff cited below regarding the separate 
existence of partnerships, without exception, stand for the 
proposition that a partnership may sue or be sued in its own name. 
E.g. , Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499 (Utah 1988); Wall 
Investment Co. v. Garden Gate Distributors, Inc., 593 P.2d 542 
(Utah 1979) . 
Unlike a corporation, which has a completely separate 
existence, partnerships are not entirely distinct from their 
partners. See McCune & McCune v. Mountain Bell Telephone, 758 P. 2d 
914, 917 (Utah 1988) (ultimately, partners may be personally liable 
for partnership debts); see also, Hartford Accident and Indemnity 
Co. v. Huddleston, 514 S.W.2d 676, 678 (Ky. App. 1974) ("although 
[UPA] regards the partnership as a legal entity for many purposes, 
these purposes are, nevertheless, limited"). Whereas corporate 
existence establishes "a wall" between third-parties and the 
corporation's principals, partnership existence is more analogous 
to "a door"—it is certainly real, but hardly absolute or insur-
mountable. 
Indeed, in Huddleston, a case very similar to the one at bar, 
the Kentucky court held, that the family members of the partners 
did have uninsured motorist coverage under a policy listing only 
the partnership as a named insured. 514 S.W.2d at 678. The court 
expressly rejected the argument, that the separate existence of the 
12 
partnership was, :. , itself, sufficient to preclude such a construc-
tion of the po] y . 
Unlike Huddleston, Ms. Turney is not asking the courts to look 
behind a designation, which names only "Split Mountain," Here, John 
'i . Huddleston • si-piitii ml fpcair.c il 
rejects the very proposition that the plaintiffs seek: the seper-
ateness of naming a partnership precludes the individual partners 
1,11 lamed :i i ISIJFFMIS" in: i ile .r c bi :isi :ri< = .ss |: • : 1 :i 2) ., ' ,• • • . • 
More fundamentally, the issue is i lot the capacity of a 
partnership t? function as a separate entity, but the »n:ent ct r. * 
t i"*anf \11 'f i -1 .r ' |";*yr t \, . I i 8ee Weber v, Snyderville Wes. 
316, 318 (Utah App. 1990) Tl whether service upor i partner .: 
effective as to the partnership turns upon "the i npcr" . •• t--
" Id. See also. Barber *• Emporium Partnership 
795, 797 (Utah 1990) ("service must be directed to the defendant 
partnership"). Notwithstanding the unquestioned capacity i • 
111 r t i in *} J I «i i i e c P 111 i • i i i I 111 I 111 | M ? t. n e i • s h i p . i • > u n u n o 11 • m 
effective on] y as to tl :te individual unless 11 specifies the 
partnership. See Weber, 800 P. 2d at 31 8; Barber, 800 P. 2d at: 79 ; 
I: it € i: € T1: I = f a c t I" 11 11 H [ *! i t M o 111 11 :. a 11: :i j s 
.<- .apacity to be a named insured, does not mean 
that :" inusr be so under t ^ .- policy question. Tr do^s n't roe^i 
I'11at' " " • - -
ai id capacity ol a partnership ,-t exclusive as to the capacity 
of the partners. _.:c iissut. remains one of construing polx^j 
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language and, as to that issue, partnership existence is only 
marginally relevant. 
American States emphasized below, that the policy declaration 
identifies the form of business as "partnership." However, the 
interpretive path, which must be followed here, makes no reference 
to form of business. The underinsured motorist provisions provide 
that, "[i]f you are an individual," your family members are 
covered. The policy defines "you" as those shown in the declara-
tion under "Named Insured." The name "John Turney" is listed. 
John Turney is an individual. Although both "John Turney" and 
"Split Mountain Construction" appear in the declaration, "Named 
Insured" and "Form of Business" are distinct categories in the 
policy. No policy provision limits or excludes who is a named 
insured based upon form of business. Specifically, American 
States1 definition of the term "you" is not in any way limited or 
qualified by form of business. 
Finally, the underinsured motorist provisions make no refer-
ence to form of business. They use the phrase "if you are an 
individual," not the phrase "if you are doing business as an 
individual" or the phrase "if the form of business is as an 
individual.w 
The fact, that the policy's general commercial liability 
provisions contain an arguably clearer distinction based upon forms 
of business, is beside the point. Construing the policy as a whole 
does not entail interpreting different language from different 
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provisions to mean the same thing. Indeed, it means quite the 
opposite—that the choice of different language suggests the intent 
to convey a different meaning. Thus, far from supporting American 
States1 construction of the relevant policy provisions, the general 
commercial liability provisions demonstrate that it was perfectly 
capable of conditioning coverage upon the form of business, when it 
chose to do so. 
Perhaps, the most telling analysis involves considering how 
easily the construction urged by American States could have been 
more clearly indicated. It could have designated the named insured 
as "Split Mountain Construction." It could have limited the named 
insured or the term "you" to the type of entity indicated in form 
of business. It could have stated, in its underinsured motorist 
provisions, that there was no "family member" coverage, unless the 
form of business was a sole proprietorship. It could have had 
different attachments describing underinsured motorist coverage for 
different forms of business, and made no reference to "family 
members" on the partnership form. 
Indeed, a number of cases have held that referring to "family 
member" coverage in the uninsured motorist provisions of a business 
policy is confusing and ambiguous, where the insurer interprets the 
policy as providing no such coverage at all. See King v. 
Nationwide Insurance Co., 519 N.E.2d 1380 (Ohio 1988); Decker v. 
CNA Insurance Co. , 585 N.E.2d 884 (Ohio App. 1990); Hawkeye-
Security Ins. Co. v. Lambrecht & Sons, Inc., 852 P.2d 1317 (Colo* 
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App. 1993); Home v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.. 791 
P.2d 61 (N.M. 1990); Grain Dealers Mut., 911 S.W.2d 775; Ceci v. 
National Indemnity Co., 622 A.2d 545 (Conn. 1993); Hager v. 
American West Ins. Co., 732 F.Supp. 1072 (D. Mont. 1989). In all 
of these cases, the courts allowed family member coverage where the 
only named insured was a corporation—which, theoretically, should 
present the strongest case against such coverage. Some of these 
cases even hold that non-shareholder corporate employees are family 
members. See King, supra; Decker, supra; Home, supra. 
There are certainly cases reaching an opposite result in the 
corporate context, some of which plaintiff cited below. See 
Lundgren v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 391 N.W.2d 542 (Minn. 1986) (family 
member of shareholder not covered); Cutter v. Maine Bonding & Cas. 
Co. , 579 A.2d 804 (N.H. 1990) (employee was not family member of 
corporation). These cases are not controlling because Ms. Turney 
is not arguing that shareholders are named insureds under a 
corporate policy or, that employees are family members of a 
corporation. She is not even arguing that individual partners 
should be treated as named insureds, where the policy identifies 
only the partnership.3 In this regard, the most pertinent 
authority, cited by either partner below, was Burnsed v. Florida 
3She is certainly not making any argument dependant upon the 
extreme position that the family members of corporate employees are 
covered by a policy identifying the corporation as the named 
insured, which was the position rejected in Herebner v. MSI Ins., 
506 N.W.2d 438 (Iowa 1993). 
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Farm Bur. Cas. Ins,. 549 So.2d 793 (Fla. App. 1989) . In that case, 
the court held that the family members of partners were not 
covered, where the policy listed only the partnership as the named 
insured. But see, Huddlestonf 514 S.W.2d 676. The court, however, 
expressly distinguished that situation from cases in which the 
partners were also individually named in the policy. See Burnsed, 
549 So. 2d at 795. Thus, even under its own case, listing Mr. 
Turney as a named insured supports interpreting the policy as 
conferring that status upon him indivudually. 
The other partnership case cited by plaintiff below (and the 
one upon which it most heavily relied) is completely inapposite. 
In Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. Swavzer. 583 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. 
App. 1979) , the issue was whether or not a partnership policy 
covered an individual partner for derivative liabilities arising 
from the operations of a different partnership. Notwithstanding 
some dicta regarding who was the named insured, the policy 
expressly excluded coverage for liabilities arising in connection 
with other partnerships or business ventures. The case had nothing 
to do with underinsured motorist coverage. Significantly, in a 
more recent decision, Texas has extended underinsured coverage to 
the family member of a corporation's sole shareholder, under a 
policy listing the corporation as the named insured. See Grain 
Dealer's Mut., 911 S.W.2d 775. 
The real error committed by the court below, was that it 
resolved this issue on the basis of policy considerations instead 
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of policy construction. It held, in essence, that accepting 
defendant's construction would expose insurers to extreme and 
unanticipated liabilities, particularly in the context of a 
partnership with many members. Such reasoning is improper, as a 
matter of law, and inaccurate, as a practical matter. It amounts 
to giving controlling effect to the insurer's subjective expec-
tations as to the scope of coverage, without regard to the language 
of the policy. 
A similar doctrine ("the reasonable expectations doctrine") 
was rejected in Allen v. Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance 
Co. , 839 P.2d 798 (Utah 1992). Moreover, in that case, it was the 
insured, who sought to invoke the doctrine. Given the manner in 
which accepted maxims of construction favor insureds, it is clear 
error to accord to an insurer, what is deemed too extreme for an 
insured. See Sandt, 854 P.2d at 522-25. Moreover, the coverage 
here cannot be deemed unexpected, where American States chose to 
list the individual partners by name, as named insureds. The 
prospect of extreme liability is illusory, unless an insurer 
chooses to list the names of all partners in a large partnership. 
In that case, the coverage would still not be unexpected, and the 
insured would have only itself to blame. See Dennis, 645 P.2d at 
675. 
Thus, the bottom line remains the same here. American States 
chose to list Mr. Turney as a named insured. American States chose 
to use a coverage form which refers to family members. This is not 
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a case in which an insured is attempting to rewrite the terms of a 
policy or invoke a strained construction. Rather, that is what 
American States, the insurer, is attempting to do. In the final 
analysis, American States failed to show that Split Mountain was 
clearly, unequivocally and unambiguously the only named insured. 
Therefore, the court below erred in declining to adopt defendant's 
reasonable construction of the policy. 
3. Joseph Price Was a "Family Member11 of John Turnev. 
Defendant is entitled to judgment on the entire case because 
it is undisputed that Joseph Price meets the definition of "family 
member." The parties agreed that the critical last issue is 
whether or not Price resided with his mother and stepfather at the 
time of the accident. Defendant introduced an affidavit in support 
of her motion, which expressly declares that Joseph Price resided 
in the Turney household.4 Such evidence, if unopposed, is 
sufficient to carry defendant's burden on this issue. See Thayne 
v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 120, 124 (Utah 1994) ("party 
opposing . . . properly supported motion [has] 'an affirmative duty 
to respond with affidavits or other materials'"). 
4As noted, there was a question as to whether the affidavit was 
unsigned, when first filed and served. The affidavit contained in 
the record is signed and sworn (R. 0185). It bears a service date 
of May 24, 1996, indicating that it was provided after defendantfs 
motion was first filed, but months before the September 3.99 6 
hearing. 
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Plaintiff maintains that this issue is disputed, but it 
offered no contrary evidence. See Thayne, 874 P.2d at 124 (party 
opposing summary judgment cannot merely deny facts, but must 
produce contravening evidence). The only minimally tangible basis 
which plaintiff provided for the proposition that Price lived 
elsewhere, is its asserting that John Turney said that Price lived 
"wherever." The record contains no sworn statement by John Turney 
as to where Price resided. It does not even contain hearsay 
testimony by someone who supposedly heard Turney1s statement. 
There is not even an unsworn explanation as to when and where he 
made this alleged comment. See Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 
1172 (Utah 1983) (merely asserting that a fact is in dispute does 
not preclude summary judgment). 
The only evidence as to where Price lived is defendant's 
affidavit. Plaintiff had the opportunity to either offer contrary 
evidence or request discovery on the issue. It did neither. 
Accordingly, if this Court adopts defendant's construction of the 
policy, it should also enter judgment in defendant's favor. 
(B) 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF WAS IMPROPER 
Even if this Court decides that defendant has failed to 
establish the propriety of her construction of the policy as a 
matter of law, it should nevertheless vacate the judgment in favor 
of plaintiff and remand for further proceedings. The fact that 
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both parties have moved for summary judgment on cross-motions "does 
not mean that [a] case must be finally disposed of as a matter of 
law." Amiacs Interwest, Inc. v. Design Associates. 635 P.2d 53, 55 
(Utah 1981) ; see also Diamond T Utah, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity 
Co. . 21 Utah 2d 124, 127, 441 P.2d 705 (1968) ("it is not true that 
once both parties move for summary judgment the court is bound to 
grant it to one side or another") . This Court must determine 
whether or not the record was sufficient to allow for construing 
the policy as a matter of law. 
In this regard, the Court need not find that defendant's 
interpretation is correct in order to hold that plaintiff failed to 
establish the correctness of its construction. This Court may 
conclude that neither interpretation is clear, as a matter of law, 
and that extrinsic evidence of intent must be used to resolve the 
matter. 
Here, as the insurer, plaintiff had the more difficult burden 
in establishing its construction. Even if the policy does not 
clearly designate Turney as a named insured, a reasonable lay 
person would not read it as unambiguously designating only Split 
Mountain. See Sandt, supra. Even if it is premature to resolve 
any ambiguity in favor of defendant, the insured, the policy is not 
sufficiently clear to allow a judgment for the insurer to stand. 
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CONCLUSION 
The court below clearly erred in concluding that Split 
Mountain was unambiguously the only named insured under the policy. 
At the very least, there is an ambiguity which compels reversal. 
In fact, however, by listing "John Turney" — by name — as a 
"Named Insured," American States unequivocally conferred that 
status upon him as an individual. He was a named insured along 
with Split Mountain. Because defendant's construction is correct 
as a matter of law and there is no dispute as to Price's residence 
(the only other relevant issue), defendant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. 
M DATED this ll/W day of April, 1997. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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